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ABSTRACT
We examine the role of organized labor in the restructuring experience of two coal mining
regions in the 1990’s: Ostrava in the Czech Republic and the Jiu Valley region in Romania.
Under similar external circumstances, the Ostrava region undertook gradual restructuring
from early on whereas in Jiu Valley there was no restructuring until 1997, followed by
massive layoﬀs over two years. We conduct a quantitative exercise that accounts for the
mine productivity, the labor market conditions, and the constraints in compensating the
laid-oﬀ miners. We show that the delay in restructuring in Jiu Valley was ineﬃcient:
gradual restructuring with compensation would have beneﬁted both the miners and the
government. The proximate reason for the delay was the Jiu Valley miners’ action against
restructuring. We interpret their action in part as a behavioral pattern under a perceived
threat to their livelihood. This accords with their history of militancy in contrast to
Ostravian miners.
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Organized labor is often characterized as an obstacle to economic progress. General
versions of this view can be found in Olson (1982) and Parente and Prescott (2000), who
designate the rent-seeking and rent-preserving activities of interest groups such as labor
unions and professional associations the key factor in stagnating economies.
1 This aspect
of organized labor is likely to be most visible when the status quo is challenged. In this
paper we conduct a case study of such an episode in the restructuring of coal mines in the
Ostrava region in the Czech Republic and the Jiu Valley region in Romania. The initial
motivation for this research came from reading about a violent protest by the Jiu Valley
coal miners,
2 which turned out to be a pattern in the restructuringexperience of the region.
Our objective is to clarify the nature of such an action with a view toward evaluating the
connection between organized labor and economic progress.
3 Did the miners’ action indeed
hinder the path of eﬃcientrestructuring? If so, what are the underlyingreasonsfor, and the
corroborating factors of, such an action? Along the way, we make useful comparisons with
Ostrava’s restructuring experience, which was markedly peaceful despite similar external
conditions.
In Section 2, we describe the restructuring experiences of the two regions, Ostrava and
Jiu Valley. At the beginning of the 1990’s, both regions went through a sharp decline in coal
production as national industrial drive ceased. Gradual restructuring, mostly downsizing
of employment, followed in the Ostrava region. In the Jiu Valley region, on the other
hand, there was no restructuring at all until 1997, when the new progressive government
managed to carry out massive layoﬀs over two years. The layoﬀs created a crisis in the
regional labor market. As alluded to above, there was a sharp contrast in the miners’
1 For the opposite view that various associations can facilitate politico-economic modernization, see
Putnam (1992).
2 See The Economist (1999).
3 The spirit of this research is shared by Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2002), who study the change
in labor productivity under increased competition in the worldwide iron-ore industry.
1behavior toward restructuring between the regions. The Ostravian miners cooperated
with the government throughout, whereas the Jiu Valley miners fought not only against
restructuring the region’s mines but against the reformist agenda in general. The extreme
swing in the Jiu Valley restructuring path reﬂected the initial success and subsequent
failure of the miners’ action in the context of national politics.
In Section 3, we conduct a quantitative exercise in order to evaluate how (in)eﬃcient
the restructuring paths were in the two regions. The presumption would be that the
extreme swing in the Jiu Valley restructuring was socially ineﬃcient: either the early
stagnant phase or the later massive-layoﬀphase would have been ineﬃcient. In comparison,
the steady pace of Ostrava’s restructuring would seem eﬃcient. By explicitly modeling the
optimal path of restructuring, we obtain a degree of clarity on the aspects of the actual
restructuring path that were ineﬃcient, which would then need to be explained. Our
method is to estimate the value of the (laid-oﬀ) miners’ labor both inside and outside the
mines, taking into consideration the expected unemployment duration, which depends on
the restructuring path. We take the discounted sum of this value to be the measure of
eﬃciency. We show that in both regions the most eﬃcient path would have been a large-
scale layoﬀ over the ﬁrst few years. The actual restructuring path of Ostrava was not far
from the most eﬃcient one whereas that of Jiu Valley was far from it: the eﬃciency-loss
(i.e., the eﬃciency-gap between the most eﬃcient and the actual path) was three times
greater in Jiu Valley than in Ostrava. Therefore, our exercise mainly supports the view
that the delay in restructuring Jiu Valley mines was socially ineﬃcient.
In Section 4, we address why restructuring was delayed in Jiu Valley. The proxi-
mate reason is the aforementioned miners’ action against restructuring. We extend our
quantitative exercise and show that gradual restructuring with severance payment under
a reasonble government budget constraint would have beneﬁted both the miners and the
government. The miners’ action is hard to rationalize in light of our exercise and the in-
dividual miners’ receptive response to the restructuring initiative by the later government.
2We interpret the miners’ action in part as a behavioral pattern under a perceived threat
to their livelihood. The historical militancy of Jiu Valley miners, in contrast to Ostravian
miners, accords with this interpretation. We also discuss the corroborating factors for the
miners’ action, in particular the miners’ alliance with the conservative faction of the gov-
ernment. A probable motivation for the conservative faction was the sheer violence that
could be unleashed by the miners toward political opponents. In the end, the success and
failure of the miners’ actions were determined by the Romanian population. When the
electorate turned against the alliance, it crumbled and the miners were ﬁnally defeated as
a political force.
In Section 5, we summarize the results and draw an overall conclusion.
2. Restructuring Experiences of the Two Regions
In this section, we describe the restructuring experiences of Ostrava and Jiu Valley
based on, among other sources, the interviews that we conducted.
4 Each of the two regions
is a well-deﬁned geographicand ec onomiczone
5 that produces virtually all deep-mined
black coal in the respective country. In the 1980’s, coal production was highly valued as
a source of energy: the national production structure was skewed toward energy-intense
heavy industries. With the beginning of transition came an abrupt decline in industrial
production, which led to a sharp reduction in coal production. In Ostrava the reduction
was on the order of 10 to 25 percent stretching over a couple of years; in Jiu Valley it was
nearly 50 percent, all within the ﬁrst year. Thus a sort of ‘demand’ shock set the stage for
restructuring. Gradual restructuring, mostly downsizing of employment, followed in the
4 We interviewed government oﬃcials, mining company managers, union representatives, and re-
searchers. Five interviews were in Prague and Ostrava in 2002, and fourteen in Bucharest, Jiu Valley,
and Cluj in 2002 and 2003. These were complemented by previous studies, mainly sociological studies on
the eﬀects of restructuring in Jiu Valley, which are referenced throughout.
5 To be precise, the Ostrava region refers to the districts of Ostrava and Karvina in northern Moravia,
and the Jiu Valley region refers to the townships of Petrosani, Aninosa, Lupeni, Petrila, Uricani, and
Vulcan in Hunedoara County.
3Ostrava region. In contrast, in the Jiu Valley region there was no restructuring at all until
1997, followed by massive layoﬀs over two years. Tables 1 and 2 present the production and
employment ﬁgures from 1990 to 2001.
6,7 Figures 1 and 2 visualize the strikingly diﬀerent
paths of restructuring between the two regions.
The diﬀerences in the two regions’ paths of restructuringmirroredthose of the national
economies. The Czech Republic made gradual, steady progress toward a market economy.
Starting further away from a market economy, Romania undertook few reforms until a new
government came to power in 1996. Between the two regions there was a marked diﬀerence
in the miners’ behavior toward restructuring. In the Ostrava region, the miners’ union
cooperated with the government - and the governmentconsulted with the union - which led
to a peaceful process of restructuring despite the signiﬁcant decline in employment. In the
Jiu Valley region, in contrast, the miners’ union was not only against mining restructuring
but was an active conservative force in national politics. Notably, miners made marches
to Bucharest, called mineriadas, on several occasions to violently quell the progressive
movement. In 1997, however, the new government managed to carry out massive layoﬀs
using a carrot and stick approach: it provided severance payments of up to 20 months of
wages while keeping the charismatic union leader Miran Cozma in jail. When the released
Cozma mounted another mineriada in 1999, the government outwitted him and put him
back in jail with a 17 year sentence; the miners were ﬁnally defeated as a political force.
6 The data for Ostrava are from the yearbooks published by the Czech Mining Institute; the data for
Jiu Valley were directly obtained from the CNH, the only mining company in the region. We cautiously
present the 1990 data for the Ostravian mines: their only source is the 1993 yearbook and the data from
this yearbook are in general somewhat diﬀerent from the subsequent yearbooks. For both regions the
employment ﬁgures are for the workers in mines, excluding the headquarters and auxiliary units. Much
of the change in the number of these excluded workers represents spin oﬀ units (e.g., social service) that
are not directly related to mining. We focus on the restructuring of mines proper and abstract from this
peripheral issue.
7 The improvement in labor productivity is largely due to downsizing. In particular, the Jiu Valley
mines had a large slack in labor until 1997, given the large initial decline in output. Further, there was
little investment in new technology in Jiu Valley throughout the period. Some Ostravian mines, however,
adopted new technology in the early years, which contributed to the improvement in productivity.
4The gradual and steady pace of the Ostravian restructuring path resulted in a favor-
able unemployment experience for the ex-miners, whereas the delayed and massive layoﬀs
in Jiu Valley created a crisis in the labor market. This can be seen in the unemployment
rates presented in Tables 1 and 2.
8 The contrasting unemployment situation stemmed in
part from the initial condition. Jiu Valley is an isolated mono-industrial region and could
oﬀer few opportunities to ex-miners. The Ostrava region had a larger and more diversiﬁed
labor market, and could absorb layoﬀs with relative ease until the late 1990’s, when the
restructuring of the metallurgical industry strained the market.
9 There was also a marked
diﬀerence in the ex-miners’ behavior toward job searches. The Ostravian ex-miners took
more initiatives to ﬁnd work and had a reputation for making good workers in new oc-
cupations. The Jiu Valley ex-miners, on the other hand, were more reluctant to accept
low-wage work and had a tendency to protest for governmental help. Notably, following
the massive layoﬀs some ex-miners mounted a hunger strike in order to obtain beneﬁts
from the government, which became routinized.
10
8 The labor market data were directly obtained in various bits from the statistics and labor oﬃces
at both the regional and national levels. We constructed unemployment rates by subtracting the oﬃcial
employment ﬁgure from the labor force. The oﬃcial unemployment rates only measure registered unem-
ployment, which underestimates unemployment during the downturn of the labor market. This problem
was in particular clear and signiﬁcant in Jiu Valley in the late 1990’s. Incidentally, the oﬃcial labor force
is measured by summing up the oﬃcial employment and unemployment ﬁgures. For the Ostrava region
we ﬁxed the size of the labor force at the average over the period since there was little population growth
or immigration during the period. For the Jiu Valley region the labor force was held at the average until
1996, and afterwards adjusted year-by-year by subtracting the signiﬁcant net-immigration out of the re-
gion. Finally, note the implausibly low unemployment rate in Ostrava in 1996, which is due to an obvious
error in the raw data for this year. Not knowing the magnitude of the error, we left it uncorrected.
9 A 1996 European Union assessment of the labor market conditions of 21 European coal mining regions
ranked the Jiu Valley region as the fourth most ‘vulnerable’ to restructuring, and the Ostrava region as
the third least vulnerable (see European Union 1996).
10 The hunger strike should be understood euphemistically: most participants left the protest site in the
evening, presumably discontinuing hunger. Further, the participants considered the granting of govern-
mental beneﬁts to non-participants as encouraging ‘free riding,’ which makes it clear that the participants
perceived the strike as a legitimate means of obtaining personal beneﬁts.
53. Evaluating the Restructuring Paths
In this section, we quantitatively evaluate the eﬃciency of the restructuring paths
in the two regions, taking into consideration the productivity inside the mines relative to
outside, and the unemployment duration following layoﬀs. Our main objective is to assess
whether the delay of restructuring in Jiu Valley was ineﬃcient in the context of the overall
restructuring path. At the outset, it is possible that the delay was relatively benign when
compared to the massive layoﬀ that followed, or even to the milder but signiﬁcant layoﬀs
in Ostrava early on.
3.1 Measuring the Value of Labor inside Mines
To measure the value of miners’ labor in coal production, we start with the following
production function:
Yt = AtK
α
t L
γ
t (1)
where Yt is the output, At is the technology parameter, Kt is all non-labor input, including
not only capital but also material input, and Lt is labor input. To assess non-labor input
during restructuring, we consulted the accounts of the dominant mining companies, the
OKD in Ostrava and the CNH in Jiu Valley, for the 1993-2000 period.
11 The non-labor
input cost as a share of revenue is on average .59 and .48, respectively, and there is no
upward or downward trend in either company. Based on this, we assume that the observed
shares are maintained throughout restructuring,
12 so (1) becomes
Yt = µ
α
1−αA
1
1−α
t L
γ
1−α
t , (2)
11 The OKD produces about 80% of Ostrava’s coal and, as mentioned, the CNH is the only mining
company in Jiu Valley. The accounts for the earlier years were not publicly available.
12 To elaborate on the rationale for constancy, it is plausible that the OKD could choose output and
non-labor input (but not labor input) throughout the period. Then the marginal product of non-labor
input would have been equal to the input price level, which implies that the non-labor input share was
equal to α in (1). The CNH, on the other hand, probably could not choose output (and labor input)
freely due to its more rigid output market, leaving no prediction on whether the non-labor input share
should increase or decrease as we move from the early to the late 1990’s: the 1997-1998 layoﬀ would have
increased the share of non-labor input as a substitute, but the accompanying reduction of output would
have had the opposite eﬀect. The CNH account suggests that the two eﬀects roughly canceled each other
out.
6where µ denotes the non-labor input share.
The technology parameter At reﬂects factors such as the upgrading of equipment, the
change in work practice, and the temporary impact of closing mines, which are important
but not dominant aspects of restructuring in our case (see footnote 7). Since our focus is
on labor downsizing, we simply assume that these other aspects of restructuring keep pace
with labor downsizing, i.e., At depends only on Lt. Further, we assume that the impact of
At on the production function is to make it linear with respect to Lt during restructuring,
so (2) becomes
Yt = ¯ Y + ˜ A(Lt − ¯ L), (3)
where ¯ Y and ¯ L are the ﬁnal ﬁxed levels of output and employment. The production
function (3) is drawn as solid lines in Figures 1 and 2.
13 The function approximates the
actual path of restructuring for the Ostrava region, while there is little reason to consider a
more complex function for the Jiu Valley region. To emphasize, (3) is assumed to be valid
during the 1990-2001 restructuring period and is not meant to be a long-run production
function.
The value of ˜ A, when production is measured at an annual rate, is 150 tons/worker
for the Ostrava region and 52 tons/worker for the Jiu Valley region. The coal price, when
measured in USD, was stable over the period except in the early 1990’s in Ostrava and in
the late 1990’s in Jiu Valley, and there is no trend upward or downward over the whole
period in either region.
14 Avoiding the nominal noises of the unstable periods, we ﬁx the
price at the average, which was 35.4 USD and 22.5 USD, respectively. The upshot of all this
13 For the Ostrava region, the function is drawn through the 1991 point rather than the 1990 point.
The large output drop from 1990 to 1991 largely represents the initial demand shock, as mentioned in
Section 2, rather than restructuring.
14 The price was measured by dividing revenue by production volume and then converting this value
to USD according to the current exchange rate. If we discount the price by the Consumer Price Index
instead, we obtain the same periods of instability and a somewhat downward trend over the whole period,
which is expected since the real value of USD depreciated over time.
7is that the value of output that accrued to the would-be-laid-oﬀ miners is p(1−µ)(Yt− ¯ Y )
in units of the current-period USD, where p denotes the coal price.
3.2 Measuring the Value of Labor outside Mines
To measure the value of ex-miners’ labor, we start with the following job-ﬁnding
function:
Mt = BU
ρ
t , (4)
where Mt is new employment, Ut is unemployment, B is a parameter that indicates the
labor market condition aside from unemployment, and ρ is an elasticity parameter. Let φt
denote the job ﬁnding rate: φt ≡ Mt/Ut. The reciprocal of this rate is the expected unem-
ployment duration (i.e., the duration that would be obtained if the rate is maintained into
the future). We can estimate the job-ﬁnding rate, or equivalently the expected unemploy-
ment duration, from the panel data of actual unemployment duration: in each period we
follow the cohort of the newly unemployed and see how many of them remain unemployed
in the following period. Estimated this way, in the Ostrava region the expected unemploy-
ment duration increased from 7.8 months in the 1993-1995 period to 18.2 months in the
1999-2001 period, an increase by a factor of 2.3.
15 Between the two periods, unemployment
increased by a factor of 3.0, which implies that ρ = .24 for the Ostrava region. In the Jiu
Valley region, unemployment increased by a factor of 4.0 from the 1993-1996 period to
the 1999-2000 period. We could estimate that the expected unemployment duration in
the latter period was about three years.
16 For the former period, we can only guess that
the expected unemployment duration may have been about one year, based on peripheral
15 We could only obtain the annual data of unemployment duration for the greater Ostrava region,
which is composed of ﬁve districts including the two districts of our interest, Ostrava and Karvina. Since
the drop in the job-ﬁnding rate may have been more severe in the two-district region, the following estimate
of ρ may be an overestimate.
16 This is based on Chiribuca, et al. (2000) and the annual data of unemployment duration for Hune-
doara county that includes Jiu Valley.
8information.
17 Assuming the three-fold increase in the expected unemployment duration
between the periods, we have ρ = .21 for the Jiu Valley region.
18 Given the values of ρ,
we can calculate from (4) that when new employment is measured on a monthly basis, the
parameter B is equal to 222 for the Ostrava region and 97 for the Jiu Valley region.
Now we specify the unemployment inﬂow that feeds into the job-ﬁnding function (4).
Let ˆ Ut denote the unemployment of ex-miners, and ˇ Ut that of the others: Ut = ˆ Ut + ˇ Ut.
The unemployment inﬂow of miners is given by the layoﬀ path: ˆ U0 =0a n d
ˆ Ut+1 =( 1− φt)ˆ Ut + Lt − Lt+1. (5)
Similarly, we have
ˇ Ut+1 =( 1− φt)ˇ Ut + Zt+1, (6)
where Zt is the inﬂow of non-ex-miners. We set ˇ U0 and Zt so that the sequence of total
unemployment corresponds to the data under the actual layoﬀ path. Recall that in both
regions unemployment was steady until 1997, after which it became signiﬁcantly worse. In
Ostrava the worsened situation was largely due to the layoﬀs in the metallurgical industry,
unrelated to mining restructuring. Accordingly, we set
Zt+1 = φt ˇ U0 (7)
for all periods except for the 1997-2000 period, and
Zt+1 = φt ˇ U0 + ¯ Z (8)
17 Based on the annual data of unemployment duration at the national level, we estimated the expected
unemployment duration to be about one year in the mid-1990’s. The unemployment rate of Jiu Valley was
comparable to the national average prior to 1997. Our guess would be valid if the labor market conditions
aside from the unemployment rate (i.e., scale-adjusted B in equations 4 and 5) were comparable, too.
18 The lack of precision for ρ is not crucial for the main result, as the sensitivity analysis in Section 3.3
shows.
9for the 1997-2000 period, where ¯ Z is a ﬁxed additional layoﬀ. In Jiu Valley the worsened
situation was virtually entirely due to the layoﬀs in mining and those linked to mining. To
preserve this linkage under various layoﬀ paths, we set
Zt+1 = φt ˇ U0 + θ(Lt − Lt+1)( 9 )
for all periods, where θ is the additional layoﬀ as a ﬁxed fraction of the mining layoﬀ.
19
The values of ˇ U0 and ¯ Z that best simulate the monthly unemployment path for Ostrava
were 14,900 and 2,500; the values of ˇ U0 and θ that do the same for Jiu Valley were 8,000
and .78.
20
Now we can calculate the sequence of ex-miners’ employment using (4) to (9):
Nt+1 = Nt + φt ˆ Ut, (10)
where Nt denotes the ex-miners’ employment.
21 We estimate the value of newly employed
ex-miners’ labor using the actual wages in the regions. In the Ostrava region, the gross
annual average wage
22 when measured in units of coal and then converted to USD,
23 was
3,507 USD in 1990 and grew at an annual rate of 4.5% on average over the years, reaching
5,709 USD in 2001. In the Jiu Valley region, for the 1993-2000 period the same method
19 There would have been extra unemployment linked to mining in Ostrava as well, although we don’t
know its size. Since the extra unemployment linked to mining would lead to a slower pace of optimal
restructuring, the bias resultingfrom the modeled asymmetry between the regions is a safe one: it reinforces
the result that the actual restructuring path in Ostrava, although slower than the optimal one, was closer
to optimal than in Jiu Valley.
20 Recall that there was a signiﬁcant emigration out of Jiu Valley in the late 1990’s, no doubt as a
consequence of the massive layoﬀs (footnote 8). Since θ is calibrated to the unemployment path in Jiu
Valley, its value is net of the emigration of those laid-oﬀ, including ex-miners.
21 Here we have assumed that the job-ﬁnding rate of the emigrant ex-miners is the same as that of the
miners who stayed (see the previous footnote). We are not sure about the employment prospects of the
emigrant ex-miners, but they were probably not very diﬀerent from those of the ex-miners who stayed.
Many of the emigrants returned after a while, unable to ﬁnd work elsewhere.
22 That is, before any taxes including the social security tax paid by the employer. The gross wage is
the proper measure of the market value of labor.
23 Thus we are measuring the value of labor both inside and outside mines in units of coal, and then
multiplying it by the price of coal, which is assumed to be ﬁxed in USD (see Section 3.1). Again, the
ﬁxed-price assumption avoids the nominal noises of periods when prices were unstable.
10yields an average wage of 2,530 USD and a virtually zero growth rate. Let wt denote the
growth path of the gross average wage as described here. For the years beyond 2001, we
assume that in both regions the annual growth rate of wt will adjust gradually to a more
typical rate of 2.0% during the 2001-2005 period, and thereafter stay at this rate. How
did the ex-miner’s wage compare to the average wage in the regions? In Ostrava it was
probably not far oﬀ from the average wage since ex-miners seem to have had little diﬃculty
in adjusting to new occupations. In Jiu Valley, in contrast, ex-miners had great diﬃculty
in adjusting to new occupations, and their wage was as low as half of the average wage in
the region.
24 Let λ denote the ex-miner’s wage as a share of the gross average wage. As a
benchmark, we assume that λ is equal to 1.00 in Ostrava, and to .75 in Jiu Valley. Putting
all this together, the value of the ex-miners’ labor is λwtNt in each period.
3.3 Measuring the Eﬃciency of Restructuring Paths
Now we are ready to evaluate the paths of restructuring, using the above calibrated
model. Let Wt denote momentary welfare, that is, the value of (laid-oﬀ) miners’ labor
both inside and outside the mines: Wt ≡ p(1 − µ)(Yt − ¯ Y )+λwtNt.L e t{La
t} denote the
actual layoﬀ path and {W a
t } the actual welfare path associated with {La
t}.T h i sw e l f a r e
path, as an annual rate, is depicted by the solid lines in Figures 3 and 4, with the 1990
level normalized as zero. In the Ostrava region, W a
t has been increasing gradually in
accordance with the gradual restructuring, except for a mild dip in the late 1990’s due to
the worsened unemployment situation. In the Jiu Valley region, W a
t changed little until
1997, after which a large downward and then upward swing followed due to the massive
layoﬀ.
24 This ﬁgure is the estimate from Chiribuca, et al. (2000). However, some of this diﬀerential is probably
transitory and reﬂects the temporarily worse labor market conditions and the trial-and-error aspect of a
job search. Ex-miners typically worked as laborers in construction, in public-works repair, and in the black
market (Larionescu, Rughinis, and Radulescu 1999).
11The welfare proper is the discounted sum of momentary welfare, and the optimal layoﬀ
path, denoted by {Lo
t}, is the one that maximizes welfare:
{L
o
t} = argmax

∞ 
t=1
β
tWt : Lt ≥ ¯ L and (3) to (10)

, (11)
where β is the discount rate.
25 Since the labor market ﬂows are on a monthly basis, we
set the period to be month-long and adjust output and wage accordingly. We assume that
β = .995, which is equivalent to an annual discount rate of about 6%.
26 We solved this
maximization problem numerically. Given a sequence of Lt, we can calculate the expected
discounted sum of the value of a miner’s labor, which only depends on the timing of his
layoﬀ. Further, we can calculate the externality that a miner imposes on the other miners
by congesting the labor market,
27 which again only depends on the timing of his layoﬀ.
The timing of layoﬀs can then be ordered by the expected discounted sum of the value
of a miner’s labor net of his externality. By construction, we can increase welfare by
moving the timing of layoﬀs from a low-value period to a high-value period. Starting with
an arbitrarily chosen sequence of Lt, we updated it repeatedly by moving the timing of
a single miner’s layoﬀ from the lowest-value period to the highest-value period until all
layoﬀ periods had the highest value.
Let {W o
t } denote the optimal welfare path associated with the optimal layoﬀ path
{Lo
t}. This welfare path is depicted by the dashed lines in Figures 3 and 4. For both
regions, there is a sharp initial decline which indicates a massive layoﬀ. In Ostrava, 63%
of all layoﬀs take place in the ﬁrst month, and the entire period of layoﬀs lasts 16 months.
Even more dramatic, in Jiu Valley the period of layoﬀs lasts only 4 months, with 97% of
25 Note that the sum is over the inﬁnite horizon. This is conceptually proper if we view restructuring
as a reallocation of labor that by default will be maintained indeﬁnitely.
26 Since the price and the wage are in units of current USD, the discount rate is a combination of the
depreciation of the currency and time preference.
27 See equation 4. Note that we are abstracting from the externality that miners impose on non-miners
or vacant ﬁrms in the labor market. Whether this externality is overall positive or negative would depend
on the labor market properties, in addition to those that we have assumed.
12all layoﬀs occurring in the ﬁrst month alone. At the beginning of the 1990’s, under the
benchmark parameter values, the value of a miner’s labor in mining as a share of that in
alternative employment is 62% in Ostrava and 32% in Jiu Valley. These value diﬀerentials
largely outweigh the congestion eﬀect of a massive layoﬀ on the labor markets, which were
initially in fair condition. Subsequent to the massive layoﬀs, W o
t rises as ex-miners ﬁnd
jobs. The unemployment duration, on average across ex-miners, is 12 months in Ostrava
and 30 months in Jiu Valley. The shorter duration for Ostrava is because of a larger
local labor market: the unemployment rate is maintained below 15% throughout, while
in Jiu Valley it reaches over 50% in the ﬁrst few months.
28 The transitional impact of
restructuring is over within the ﬁrst two or three years in Ostrava and by the middle of the
1990’s in Jiu Valley, after which W o
t follows the respective wage growth in the regions. The
overall ineﬃciency of actual restructuring can be measured as the diﬀerence in welfare (i.e.,
the sum in (11)) between the optimal and the actual paths as a share of welfare under the
optimal path, i.e.,
∞
t=1βt(W o
t − W a
t )/
∞
t=1βtW o
t . This measure of ineﬃciency is 8.8%
for the Ostrava region, and 26.7% for the Jiu Valley region. Thus the actual restructuring
path was three times more ineﬃcient in Jiu Valley than in Ostrava.
The main result of the exercise is that the delay of restructuring in Jiu Valley was
indeed ineﬃcient. The layoﬀ of 1997, on the other hand, is justiﬁable: given that there
was no restructuring until then, the optimal path would be a massive layoﬀ as occurred.
In Ostrava the pace of restructuring should have been faster too, but the welfare loss is
much smaller than in Jiu Valley since there was a substantial layoﬀ from early on while
the case for a massive layoﬀ is weaker than in Jiu Valley. A natural question is how
sensitive the results are to the assumed parameter values. In this regard there are three
28 The relatively favorable labor market outcome in Ostrava may be an exaggeration since we have
assumed extra unemployment linked to, and in proportion to, mining unemployment in all periods in Jiu
Valley, but not in Ostrava (see Section 3.2). If we assume extra unemployment linked to mining in Ostrava
as well, the resulting unemployment rate would be higher although this eﬀect would be mitigated by the
slower restructuring pace (see Footnote 19). Regardless, under any reasonable size of extra unemployment,
a large diﬀerence in the labor market outcome between the regions would remain.
13key parameters, the productivity parameter ˜ A, the ex-miner’s wage factor λ,a n dt h ej o b -
ﬁnding elasticity ρ. The ﬁrst two parameters matter only as a ratio, i.e., holding ˜ A/λ
constant, any change leads to only a re-scaling of welfare (see (11)). To see the extent to
which the pace of optimal restructuring can be slowed down, we increase this ratio by 50%,
which is probably the reasonable upper bound. We also set ρ = 0, which implies that job
creation is completely irresponsive to an increase in unemployment. Under these sets of
values, the initial layoﬀ as a percentage of the entire layoﬀ decreases to 21% in Ostrava and
to 44% in Jiu Valley, and the layoﬀ duration increases to 50 and 68 months, respectively.
Therefore, the optimal restructuring path is moderate relative to the benchmark, but still
exhibits quicker layoﬀs than the actual path.
29
4. Explaining The Restructuring Paths
In this section, we address the central question that emerges from the quantitative
exercise: why was restructuring delayed in Jiu Valley? At the center of our explanation
is the miners’ action against restructuring. The miners were a force to be reckoned with
not only in mining restructuring but also in national politics. The mineriadas, the min-
ers’ marches, in the early 1990’s were eﬀective in suppressing progressive voices such as
intellectuals and students as well as right-wing politicians. Without the miners’ action,
the structural reform of the economy would have proceeded faster and, in particular, some
kind of mining restructuring would probably have occurred in the early 1990’s.
4.1 Gradual Restructuring with Transfer Payments
We ﬁrst examine whether the diﬃculty of extracting the beneﬁts from early restruc-
turing led the miners to pursue a delay in restructuring. Our strategy is to see whether
we could design a plausible transfer scheme that would have beneﬁted both the miners
29 The ineﬃciency measure for the actual path, under these alternative parameter values, is 5.6% in
Ostrava and 26.5% in Jiu Valley. The small change in ineﬃciency from the benchmark in Jiu Valley is the
result of two oﬀ-setting eﬀects: the ineﬃciency of inaction in the early 1990’s is reduced but the speed of
layoﬀs in the late 1990’s becomes too fast.
14and the government. An implicit assumption is that the welfare eﬀects of actual restruc-
turing on the miners and the government represent what both parties could expect at the
beginning of the 1990’s. We will discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption in
Section 4.2. We focus on a lump-sum severance payment, which was the means of com-
pensation in actual restructuring. We doubt that a more sophisticated transfer scheme
could have worked. For example, severance payment in installments would have allowed
a greater ﬂexibility in restructuring paths but it would not have appeared credible: there
was a general lack of trust in the government and, once laid oﬀ, the miners might not have
been able to make the government stick to its side of the bargain.
30 Given that optimal
restructuring requires a massive layoﬀ at the beginning of 1990’s, the main diﬃculty of the
scheme is its ﬁnancing: the government was not running budget deﬁcits but its ability to
borrow was limited, which reﬂects its lack of credibility among creditors.
31 This limits the
pace of restructuring to be gradual.
Let Gt denote the net government spending on miners in period t given layoﬀ path
{Lt} and severancepayments {st}: Gt ≡ ˜ λwt(1−τ)·Lt−p(1−µ)Yt+st(Lt−1−Lt)−λτwtNt,
where ˜ λ denotes the miner’s wage premium and τ the tax on wages. The ﬁrst two terms
are the net spending on current miners, the second term the severance payments, and
the third term the tax revenue from ex-miners. The miner’s wage was about 63% above
the average wage in Jiu Valley in the 1990s, so we set ˜ λ =1 .63. We set τ = .46, which
includes the social security and income taxes.
32 The actual severance payments ranged
from 12 to 20 months of the miner’s wage during the large layoﬀ starting in 1997. For the
actual restructuring path, we approximate the severance payments by setting st to be 16
30 More generally, there is an argument that the workers’ unions ﬁght over the size of membership as a
means of ensuring future rents. See Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) for a formal treatment of this.
31 The government was widely perceived as unreformed ex-communists. The miners’ action itself sig-
niﬁcantly contributed to this perception (see Section 4.3). Had the miners and the government pursued
early restructuring as envisioned here, the creditors may have been more receptive.
32 The employer paid about 38% of wages as social security tax. The employee paid about 25% of wages
as income tax. So, the total tax rate is (1-25%)/(1+38%).
15months of a miner’s net wage from 1997 to 1999, and to be zero otherwise. For the gradual
restructuring path, we ﬁx st at a level denoted by ¯ s. We assume that the budget constraint
allows a ﬁxed per-period expense B in addition to the actual expenses on miners: for all
T ≥ 1,
T 
t=1
β
t
G
g
t − G
a
t − B

≤ 0, (12)
where Ga
t denotes the spending under actual restructuring and G
g
t that under gradual
restructuring.
Given B and ¯ s, the gradual layoﬀ path is given by the right-hand side of (11) with (12)
as an additional constraint. A higher value of B allows for faster restructuring. We base its
value on the actual government spending on the mines at the beginning of the 1990’s. The
total wage bill (i.e., ˜ λw0L0) was 138 million USD in annual rate. It becomes 79.9 million
after subtracting the sales revenue (i.e., p(1 − µ)Y0), and 16.7 million USD after further
subtracting the tax revenue (i.e., τ˜ λw0L0). We consider 50% of the ﬁnal ﬁgure within the
reasonable range of additional spending, and set B equal to 8.4 million USD annually. This
is modest in comparison to about 49 million USD that the government spent on severance
payments in 1997 when it initiated the layoﬀ. The values of ¯ s are limited by the condition
that the scheme should beneﬁt both the miners and the government. Let ρ denote the
government share of the welfare gain:
∞ 
t=1
βt
Ga
t − G
g
t

= ρ
∞ 
t=1
βt
W
g
t − W a
t

, (13)
where W
g
t denotes the momentary welfare under gradual restructuring. A higher value
of ¯ s implies a lower value of ρ, and vice-versa. Thus the gradual restructuring paths are
parameterized by ρ in between 0 and 1.
Depending on ρ,t h ev a l u e so f¯ s range from 7,000 to 10,100 USD, or 37.5 to 54 months
of a miner’s net wage. The welfare gain (i.e., the right-hand side of (13) without ρ) ranges
from 61.4 to 76.6 million USD, a higher value ρ corresponding to a greater welfare gain
16due to a faster and therefore more eﬃcient pace of restructuring. As a corollary, the ﬁrst
ﬁgure in the range is the upper bound in the miners’ welfare gain, which translates to
3,300 USD, or 17.5 months of the miner’s net wage, per laid-oﬀ miner. The layoﬀ starts
with 70 to 100 miners in the ﬁrst month and gradually accelerates reaching 350 to 600
miners in the ﬁnal months.
33 The gradual acceleration is because the savings in the mines
and the tax revenue from ex-miners accumulate allowing the government an increasing
expense on severance payments. The entire duration of the layoﬀ is 61 to 79 months,
which implies that gradual restructuring would have been (nearly) over by the time when
actual restructuring began. The dotted line in Figure 2 draws the welfare path under
gradual restructuring when ρ = .5, in which case the miners and the government would
have divided the welfare gain equally and we obtain approximately the mid-point in all
the above ranges. In summary, gradual restructuring with a lump-sum severance payment
scheme, under a reasonable government budget constraint, would have beneﬁted both the
miners and the government.
34
4.2 The Nature of the Miners’ Action
We now examine what motivated the miners’ action against restructuring, aside from
the diﬃculty of extracting the beneﬁts from early restructuring and in the order of ease
with which they can be reconciled with our quantitative exercise. One possibility is that
the miners expected that restructuring could be delayed longer than it actually was, which
would have increased their payoﬀ from the delay.
35 The issue is whether such an expec-
tation was reasonable and whether it lowers the payoﬀ from early restructuring relative
33 The 350 ﬁgure is after excluding the last seven months of layoﬀ, when the layoﬀ pace jumps above
700 a month, reﬂecting the jump in actual spending associated with the 1997 layoﬀ.
34 We conducted a sensitivity analysis on ˜ A, λ,a n dρ, as in Section 3. The gradual restructuring path
varies little across diﬀerent values. This is because the budget constraint (12) is the binding constraint,
little aﬀected by these parameters.
35 A 1993-1994 survey conducted by the mining company CNH shows that a majority of employees
believed that downsizing would occur, but they were much less concerned about its danger than that of
inﬂation (see Krausz 1999).
17to that from the delay in restructuring. Perhaps, the miners expected that the demand
for coal could recover after its initial collapse, which would have reduced the necessity
of restructuring. There was no speciﬁc reason for such an expectation but there was a
good deal of uncertainty about economic prospects in general. If we incorporate the pos-
sibility of recovery of demand into our exercise, it would slow down the optimal pace of
restructuring but not to a halt, much like the transfer constraints do. In other words,
uncertain demand makes a case for gradual restructuring rather than against it. Perhaps,
the miners expected that the government would continue to pay for the loss in the mines
instead of opting for the layoﬀ in 1997. The 1997 layoﬀ was indeed a consequence of the
electoral success of reformist parties, which could not have been foreseen. If we incorporate
the possibility of a further delay in restructuring into our exercise, however, the welfare
gain from early restructuring becomes only larger and gradual restructuring with a greater
level of transfer would beneﬁt both the miners and the government in comparison to their
expected payoﬀs from the delay.
Another possible motivation for the miners’ action is that they were concerned about
the unfair burden of restructuring on the laid-oﬀ miners. In our exercise, the welfare of a
laid-oﬀ miner falls below that of a retained miner even under gradual restructuring with
severance payment. For a miner who was 35 years old and had 20 years of remaining
work life in 1990, his welfare loss would have been 3,200 to 6,400 USD, or 17 to 34.5
months of the miner’s net wage, depending on the severance payment. This could be an
underestimate since our exercise ignored the social costs of large unemployment such as
the spread of alcoholism and higher crime and divorce rates, as observed in the aftermath
of the 1997 layoﬀ (see Larionescu, et al. 1999 and Kideckel 2000). Many of these costs
would be borne by the laid-oﬀ miners themselves. Nonetheless, the advantage of early
restructuring over delayed restructuring remains. A built-in feature of severance payment
as a transfer method is to compensate precisely those who would suﬀer from layoﬀs, so the
miners’ welfare gain from early restructuring would go entirely to the laid-oﬀ miners. As
18mentioned, in our exercise the expected gain for a laid-oﬀ miner is up to 3,300 USD, or
17.5 months of the miner’s net wage, equivalent to eliminating a half of the above-proﬁled
miner’s welfare loss. Consideration for social costs only strengthens the case for a gradual
layoﬀ since they are presumably the most acute when unemployment is concentrated in a
short period.
The reasons discussed above are all based on the assumption that the miners’ ac-
tion was driven by their rational calculations in maximizing their welfare. Our view is
that rational calculations fall short of fully explaining the miners’ action. In particular,
the rationale for the last mineriada of 1999 is hard to imagine: it took place facing the
united progressive government after the massive layoﬀ was nearly ﬁnished. The diﬃculty
is compounded by individual miners’ reactions to the restructuring initiative by the new
government in 1997. The large number of miners who opted for the layoﬀ was beyond
expectation and the government had to take some measures to curb the layoﬀ after the
initial round. This is hard to reconcile with their collective behavior. In our exercise, the
miners as a whole were excessively resistant to restructuring while they were individually
excessively conducive to it. We do not have a rigorous explanation, but we believe that
this is more than a mere characterization of the miners’ behavior.
From our interviews and reading of the descriptive literature on the region, it emerged
that group militancy may be a behavioral pattern of Jiu Valley miners under perceived
threats to the status-quo. During the communist era, the miners acquired the reputation
for militancy and considered themselves the backbone of labor. For example, the 1977
revolt, the last before the 1990’s, was a reaction to the belt-tightening policy of industri-
alization under Ceausescu’s regime, achieved various improvements in miners’ livelihoods
and heralded a series of similar actions in the other regions. At the same time, individual
myopism may be another behavioral pattern of Jiu Valley miners. Chiribuca, et al. (2000)
argues that it was irrational short-sighted behavior for the miners to accept the compen-
sation package and become unemployed in 1997 and 1998 when they had little prospect of
19ﬁnding alternative employment.
36 The authors point out that the less educated and thus
lower-prospect miners were more likely to accept the compensation package. Most miners
consumed away the compensation payment rather than use it to prepare themselves for
new work (e.g., training, relocation). Having exhausted the payment, some miners re-
sorted to ways of obtaining short-term beneﬁts from the government rather than actively
searching for new work, as highlighted by the hunger-strikes.
The behavioral pattern of Jiu Valley miners sharply contrasts with that of Ostra-
vian miners. The latter did not have a history of revolt and confrontation, and in the
1990’s cooperated with the government and carried out gradual restructuring from early
on. Further, individual miners were proactive in looking for and adjusting to new work.
Militancy as a behavioral pattern helps explain the events in the 1990’s to the extent that
they were predictable based on the (absence of) previous actions. Looking beyond the two
regions of our inquiry, it is not new that a labor union may ﬁght a losing battle to the
end. A good example is the 1984 British coal miners’ strike.
37 The British miners went on
a year-long strike against restructuring despite an oﬀer of a generous severance payment.
In the end the strike achieved nothing but lost pay and a ruined reputation for the min-
ers. The miners, at least the union leadership, seem to have been driven by more than
the narrow economic interests of the miners; perhaps they were driven by the ideology of
socialist order or, more speciﬁcally, the involvement of the union in management decision
making. The tripartite agreement, achieved ten years earlier through a series of strikes,
indeed guaranteed something of this nature. The turning point was the attempt by the
Thatcher government to nullify this arrangement. Under a threat to the status quo and
under the memory of previous successful strikes, the miners may have been overly prepared
for action, not unlike the Jiu Value miners.
36 The government may have chosen the compensation package rather than a more comprehensive labor
conversion program because the compensation package minimized the resistance from the myopic miners.
This is in line with the political aspect of restructuring, discussed in Section 4.3.
37 See Edwards and Heery (1989) for an excellent study of labor relations leading up to this episode.
204.3 The Corroborating Factors for the Miners’ Action
We now examine why the miners’ action was eﬀective in delaying restructuring. The
miners received at least tacit support from the conservative faction within the government.
Without it, their action could easily have failed as the later events under the successor
government demonstrate. It is debatable how much of the support reﬂected the conserva-
tives’ stance on reform policy. Some, notably President Iliescu himself, may have genuinely
believed that the reform could and should do without large-scale enterprise restructuring.
They may have been hopeful of an economic turnaround without restructuring, being con-
cerned about its social and distributive consequences. We examined these concerns as
pertains to the Jiu Valley restructuring in Section 4.2. As mentioned, our view is that
justiﬁable caution does not explain the absence of initiatives for Jiu Valley restructuring
in the early 1990’s. The Ostrava region did carry out substantial restructuring early on,
even tough the initial demand shock and the necessity of restructuring were similar to, in
fact within our exercise weaker than, those in Jiu Valley.
A more sinister reason for the conservatives’ allying with the miners can be ascertained
from the aforementioned miners’ role in national politics. Notably, a 1991 mineriada forced
the resignationof reform-mindedPrimeMinister Roman, the arch-rivalof PresidentIliescu.
It was widely believed that the conservative faction of the government called for the miners’
action. Thus the conservative faction may have wanted to keep miners as a useful political
force. Conversely, the massive layoﬀ of 1997 under the progressive government may have
been in part motivated by its desire to eliminate an opposition force while possible.
38
This is a rationalization of the view, expressed by many in our interviews, that the new
government took ‘revenge’ on miners for the earlier mineriadas. This aspect of the layoﬀ
corroborates with the fact that the ﬁnal mineriada of 1999 seems to have taken place in
alliance with the new nationalist party that tried to overthrow the government.
38 This interpretation can be couched in an extension of the argument in Footnote 30: a government
tries to eﬀect the size of a union as a means of ensuring the beneﬁt, or eliminating the harm, from the
union.
21The miners’ action was ultimately arbitrated by the Romanian population. Although
the mineriadas were an extra-legal method of inﬂuencing policy, they were sympathetically
received by a large segmentof the Romanian society. The electoral success of 1990 and 1992
gave basic strength to the conservative faction of the government, which was supplemented
by the miners’ action. Conversely, the election of 1996 drove out the conservative faction
and installed the new progressive government, which was willing to confront the miners.
When the alliance with the conservatives crumbled, the miners were outmaneuvered in the
mineriada of 1999 and ﬁnally defeated as a political force.
39 Therefore, the success of the
miners’ action was bound by its appeal to sections of the government and, by extension,
to the population at large.
5. Conclusion
Our exercise shows that the delay in restructuring the Jiu Valley mines was indeed
ineﬃcient: it stands out as the main source of ineﬃciency in the overall restructuring path,
all the more so when compared to Ostrava’s restructuring path. Gradual restructuring
with severance payment under a reasonable government budget constraint would have
beneﬁted both the miners and the government. Thus our exercise fails to (fully) explain
the Jiu Valley miners’ action against restructuring. Our view is that this failure lies in the
strategy of explaining the miners’ action based on their rational calculations in maximizing
their welfare, rather than in the particular assumptions of the exercise. We interpret the
miners’ action in part as a behavioral pattern under a perceived threat to their livelihood.
The historical militancy of Jiu Valley miners, in contrast to Ostravian miners, accords with
this interpretation. Essential for the success of the miners’ action was the alliance with the
conservative faction of the government; the alliance itself was arbitrated by the Romanian
electorate. We are admittedly vague about the development of militancy in Jiu Valley
39 The epilogue of this sequence of events is the reemergence of the conservative faction in the 2000
election. By then the main phase of mining restructuring was ﬁnished.
22and about the changes in the societal support for the miners’ action. We can only muse
that the Jiu Valley restructuring may represent a sort of adaptive learning experience for
the Romanian society, whereby economic conﬂicts are increasingly resolved in the market
rather than in the political arena.
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24Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Mines:
  Production in thousand tons 29,843 24,749 23,437 23,351 22,448 21,849 21,854 21,312 20,599 18,478 18,898 19,331
  Employment in mines 62,087 60,796 53,553 44,448 38,429 36,652 35,131 33,306 31,208 25,140 22,714 21,482
  Labor productivity 481 407 438 525 584 596 622 640 660 735 832 900
Labor Market:
  Unemployment rate in percent 1.2 6.5 4.8 7.1 6.5 5.6 1.7 8.7 14.5 18.3 19.8 20.2
  Average gross annual wage in crowns 43,284 50,916 62,640 78,432 92,076 109,296 128,076 139,356 151,608 159,612 161,436 166,524
  Average gross annual wage in USD 2,096 2,331 2,993 3,632 4,319 5,558 6,371 5,933 6,342 6,228 5,648 5,910
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Mines:
  Production in thousand tons 4,998 4,527 4,921 5,040 5,450 5,368 5,972 4,927 3,962 3,502 3,701 4,033
  Employment in mines 33,562 34,433 34,648 35,275 36,307 35,247 35,061 18,578 16,109 15,601 15,591 15,029
  Labor productivity 149 131 142 143 150 152 170 265 246 224 237 268
Labor Market:
  Unemployment rate in percent 8.7 9.1 9.5 11.9 18.8 33.2 44.9 43.4
  Average gross annual wage in thousand lei 1,191 2,998 4,619 6,691 12,081 17,948 25,449 37,243
  Average gross annual wage in USD 2,163 2,500 3,135 2,994 2,326 2,791 2,290 2,367
Table 1: Ostrava Region
Table 2: Jiu Valley Region 
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